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In this paper we offer an introductory exploration of inequality, considering how 
political economy has analysed economic inequality. Its roots in market processes and 
in the functional distribution of income are investigated, considering the role of 
human capital, technological change and globalisation, and the relevance of 
intergenerational inequalities. We then consider the impact that public policies can 
have on inequalities through taxation, welfare expenditures, the provision of public 
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Introduction 
 
In capitalism, inequalities are everywhere. They are founded on the division between 
capitalists who own the means of production and workers who sell their labour force. 
Capitalists and firms are engaged in competition with one another, resulting in 
unequal economic fortunes, further complicated by the evolving relationships 
between industrial and financial capital. Workers find themselves in increasingly 
segmented labour markets and are divided between men and women, knowledge and 
manual workers, white and blue collars, craft and unskilled operators, permanent and 
temporary workers, local and migrant labour, not to mention the reserve army of the 
unemployed.  
These inequalities in class, professional, employment and social conditions –
complicated by those in gender and ethnic status – lead to measurable inequalities in 
incomes, status, access to economic and social rights and to public services, 
opportunities for upward social mobility.  
In this paper we offer an introduction of how political economy has addressed the 
challenge of inequality, and we focus on the analysis of economic inequality, 
considering its roots in market processes and in the functional distribution of income, 
the role of human capital, technological change and globalisation, and the relevance 
of intergenerational inequalities. We then consider the impact that public policies can 
have on inequalities through taxation, welfare expenditures, the provision of public 
services, redistribution and other actions.  
  
Inequality in political economy 
 
Inequality has always been – from Rousseau, to Marx, to Sen - a major reason for a 
criticism of the existing economic and political order; political economy perspectives 
on inequality have generally focused on two questions - capitalism’s income 
distribution as the source of inequality, and the possibility of redistribution through 
political authority. 
Much of political economy - Marxist and Keynesian – has considered inequality as a 
direct result of income distribution between capital and labour. Marx emphasised the 
contradiction between industrial capitalism’s potential for progress in knowledge, 
incomes and wealth, and its outcome - capital accumulation for the capitalist class, 
and commodified labour, degraded work, limited wages and hard social conditions for 
workers and the dispossessed. Increasing inequalities were the result of the very 
nature of capitalist accumulation. 
Keynesian economics asserted the link between income distribution, accumulation 
and growth and advocated an active role of the State in managing demand, growth 
and redistribution.  Insights from welfare economics informed the normative models 
for economic policy aiming at redistribution, pointing out the trade-offs between 
efficiency and equity in static and dynamic contexts. By combining Post-Keynesian 
perspectives and attention to the role of institutions and public policies, the French 
Regulationist school explored the mechanisms of productivity growth and social 
redistribution that - in advanced countries during the “Fordist” period – made possible 
sustained growth and limited inequality. 
Moving to an international or even global perspective, world income inequalities have 
been investigated in their evolution over time (Milanovic, 2005); key determinants 
have been identified in the different phases of development, in the patterns of global 
flows of knowledge, trade and finance or in countries’ positions in the core or   3
periphery of the world system (Arrighi, 1991). Since Kuznets (1965), evidence was 
found of an inverted-U relationship between levels of inequality and countries’ per 
capita income; industrialization and growth would first increase inequalities, which 
then would decline as a result of redistribution and more balanced growth. However, 
since the early 1980s, several rich countries have experienced a new increase of 
inequalities. 
The search for explanations has led to consider more complex and specific 
mechanisms beyond aggregate income distribution (Atkinson and Bourguignon, 2000; 
Franzini and Pianta, 2009). First, functional income distribution leads to inequalities 
in factor incomes. Second, growing differences within wages may increase 
inequalities among employees. Third, inequalities in family revenues are the result of 
the combination of incomes from different sources and of family structures. Fourth, 
the redistributive effects of taxation, social incomes – pensions and subsidies - and 
access to public services provided outside the market shape inequalities among 
families in terms of net incomes and standard of living. 
In recent decades, the growing shares of profits and financial rents have polarised 
income distribution, while rising inequalities in wages have been related to diversities 
in human capital and skills, technological change, international production, labour 
market segmentation and liberalisation, lowering of labour standards. A new literature 
has focused on top incomes, combining rents, profits and unprecedented high 
compensation from managerial or professional work (Atkinson and Picketty, 2007). 
The reduced resources for redistribution have often weakened the capacity of public 
policies to limit inequalities in family revenues. In addition, the inter-generational 
dimension of inequality has been introduced, examining the transfer of resources and 
the potential for social mobility across generations. 
The role of redistribution – its desirability and effects on efficiency and justice – has 
been at the centre of intense debate. Liberal theories of justice have stated the primacy 
of individuals’ freedom of choice and explored the possibilities of reducing inequality 
without limiting liberty. Rawls (1971) argued that in a society made of rational, self-
interested individuals, a majority would accept a redistribution that improves the 
position of the worse off in a society. An emphasis on equality of opportunities – as 
opposed to equality of outcomes – has characterised recent conceptualisations, as in 
Roemer (1998). Moving beyond such abstract models, Amartya Sen has pointed out 
the complexity of inequality, rooted in societies’ historical contexts, in the capabilities 
available to people, families and social groups in the pursuit of their objectives, in the 
concrete opportunities individuals have to make decisions about their lives (Sen, 
1992, 2009), broadening the view of justice and the rationale for redistribution and 
action against specific sources of inequality. 
 
Concepts, measures and data 
 
The concept of inequality can be used to assess distances,  between countries, 
between regions, between social classes, between individuals or families with 
different incomes (before or after the effects of taxes and public expenditure), 
between firms. Distances can be measured in several dimensions: income, wealth, 
rights, capabilities, access to services, wellbeing.  
Economic inequality on an international scale has been explored in terms of 
differences among national average incomes, among averages weighted by 
population, and among all individuals (Milanovic, 2005). Over the past century - 
considering Gini coefficients, that sum the distance from the average of units of   4
observation ranked according to income - there is a clear increase in the first measure 
of inequality, an increase followed by a moderate reduction since the 1960s in the 
second one, and an increase followed by stability since the 1960s in the third one 
(ibid. p. 143). 
Economic inequality within countries is characterized by large and persistent 
differences. Considering advanced countries, in the mid-2000’s the Gini coefficient 
on disposable monetary income for households was between 0.38 and 0.34 for the 
US, Italy and the UK; ranged between 0.32 and 0.28 for Japan, Spain, Korea, 
Germany and France, while Denmark and Sweden were the least unequal countries, 
with Gini values around 0,23 (OECD, 2008; Brandolini and Smeeding, 2008).  
In almost all EU countries the previous narrowing of disposable income inequality 
was reversed in the early 1980s, giving way to a  generalized increase in inequality. 
Such an increase has been particularly strong in Finland, Norway, Germany, Portugal 
and Italy, as well as in the US. A rise in income shares by the top quintile of the 
income distribution (the richest 20% of households) has been a key determinant of 
greater inequalities in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Denmark, Germany, Austria, and 
Italy, as well as in the US and Canada. In the last twenty years, the average annual 
growth of real incomes of the top quintile has been twice as large as  the one of the 
bottom quintile (the poorest 20% of households) in Finland, Sweden, the UK, 
Germany, Italy, as well as in the US (OECD, 2008).  
A different measure of inequality is the ratio between the income beyond which we 
find the richest ten percent of population and the top income of the poorer ten percent 
(P90/P10). For disposable incomes of families, such ratios in the mid-1980s were 5.9 
in the US, 4 in Italy, 3.8 in the UK, 3.5 in France, 3 in Germany, 2.7 in Sweden. 
Considering inequalities among wages and comparing 1970 and 1990, the ratio has 
increased from 3.2 to 4.5 in the US, from 2.5 to 3.3 in the UK and has remained at 2.1 
in Sweden (Picketty, 2002).  The recession that followed the international financial 
crisis of 2008 is likely to further exacerbate income inequalities in many countries 
(ILO, 2009).  
A comparative study of advanced and developing countries (Cornia, 2004) found that 
most countries – with the exception of Latin America and part of Sub-Saharan Africa 
– experienced decreasing inequalities from the 1950s to the 1970s, with a new rise 
since the 1980s. Such a growth was particularly marked in post-Socialist countries of 
Eastern Europe, while a moderate rise is found since the 1980s in Asian economies 
and in most Latin American countries. In the largest Asian countries – China and 
India – a complex pattern has emerged, with rapidly rising incomes – and inequalities 
- in urban areas and a modest rise of incomes – and inequalities - among rural 
population (World Bank 2006). 
While most studies have focused on income inequality, there is some evidence on the 
distribution of wealth (Jantti et al 2008; OECD 2008). The Gini coefficients on 
household wealth (net worth, equal to total assets less debt) in years around 2000 
were 0.77 for the US, 0.73 for Germany, 0.67 for Canada, 0.62 for Sweden and 0.60 
for Italy. Considering financial assets alone, the US climbs to 0.89 and Germany to 
0.82. Non financial assets (including houses) are slightly less concentrated (0.73 in 
the US and 0.75 in Germany). In general, wealth appears to be twice as much 
concentrated as income in rich countries. In the US and Germany the net worth of the 
90
th percentile (the richest ten percent of households) is more than ten times the net 
worth of the median person (the person between the fifty per cent richer and the fifty 
per cent poorer); in Sweden the value is eight, in Italy four (considering the diffusion 
of home ownership).   5
 
The forces shaping income inequalities  
 
Inequalities in income are the result of the overall relationships between capital and 
labour and of changes taking place in production systems, labour markets, social 
variables and in the redistributive activity of the welfare state.  
A first process involves the functional distribution of income between wages, profits 
and rents (see the chapter on Income distribution in this volume). As a result of 
changes in the balance of forces between labour and capital, since 1980 most 
advanced countries have experienced a significant reduction of the labour share in 
GDP, of the order of ten percentage points (Salverda et al, 2009, ch.5). Labour has 
been less able to capture an adequate share of the economy’s productivity gains; since 
2003 one third of European workers has experienced a decline in real wages, and 
almost two thirds saw their wages growing, on average, less than their labour 
productivity. Conversely, capital income has increased its share thanks to several 
factors. First, liberalisation of capital movements, growing financial activities, the 
search for short-term speculative gains, the ability to elude national taxation have led 
to a growing share of capital. Within this rise, financial rents have grown fastest; in 
the US the ratio of aggregate profits of the financial sector to profits of non-financial 
activities has moved from 20 per cent in the 1970s to 50 percent after 2000 (Glyn 
2006, ch.3). 
Second, technological change is likely to favour profits over wages; the former are 
driven both by new products and by restructuring through the diffusion of new 
processes and wage depressing job reductions, while wages expand only in research-
intensive industries, according to a study on EU manufacturing and services (Pianta 
and Tancioni, 2008). 
Third, global production systems have further favoured profits; in advanced countries 
the relocation of production abroad (or even the threat of relocation) has depressed 
domestic wage dynamics, especially for blue collars and low-skilled white collar 
workers (Feenstra and Hanson, 2003). Globalisation has doubled the labour force 
available in the world economy and lowered the overall capital/labour ratio, leading to 
a greater (relative) scarcity of capital, resulting in higher profits and inequality; 
increasing trade, greater openness of national economies and tariff reductions are 
likely to contribute to greater inequalities within countries (Salverda et al., 2009, 
ch.23).  
A second process concerns labour market mechanisms and the way they influence 
wage dispersion among workers on the basis of education, skills, professional groups, 
types of labour contracts, presence of unions and, more generally, through the 
regulations of labour markets; these outcomes also reflect the effects of technological 
change and globalisation pointed out above. Changes in the relative composition of 
employment by professional skills have been interpreted by mainstream economics as 
skill bias technological change, i.e. innovations replace unskilled labour with workers 
with higher competences and job opportunities for blue collars worsen; the resulting 
inequality is presented as a 'natural' effect of technological change. However, 
advanced countries did not experience a general upskilling as a result of technological 
change; rather, a strong polarisation of the employment structure has emerged, with 
jobs offered mainly to managers and professionals and to unskilled manual workers, 
while job losses have mainly concerned clerks and craft manual workers. A similar 
polarisation is evident in the distribution of wages in Europe, as relatively few top 
managers (classified as employees, and not as capitalists) and professionals have   6
obtained unprecedented high incomes. Conversely, the lower tail to the wage 
distribution has been further lowered by the diffusion in several countries - Italy, 
Spain, Ireland and Germany in particular - of part-time, temporary and outsourced 
work; this is the result of policies of precarisation of employment that have led to the 
emergence also in Europe of "working poors" - people with jobs who remain in 
conditions of poverty. Increasing international integration - through trade, foreign 
investment and cross border organisation of production - has further contributed to 
such labour market outcomes, especially in some European countries (Franzini and 
Pianta, 2009). 
A third process concerns the inter-generational persistence of inequality and the role 
that higher human capital can play in assuring upward social mobility. Approaches 
emphasising equality of opportunities have pointed out that differences in human 
capital can lead to ‘acceptable’ income inequalities. In fact, in several advanced 
countries income disparities across generations are highly related to current 
inequalities, showing a persistence – rooted in family wealth, privilege and networks 
of connections - stronger than the one expected by the advocates of social mobility 
through "equal opportunities" and market processes (Franzini and Raitano, 2009). 
These mechanisms do not operate in isolation; for instance, welfare expenditures in 
education may alter, in the medium term, the supply of skilled workers and this, in 
turn, may change the degree of wage dispersion in the labour market. Moreover, the 
countries with higher current inequality seem to be the same where the 
intergenerational transmission of inequality is higher. This suggests that fighting 
current inequality may help make social mobility a more concrete possibility. 
Finally, the complexity of factors leading to a rise of inequality since the 1980s 
provides no clear evidence that higher inequality can be favourable to growth. 
Conversely, economic growth cannot assure a lower inequality, as trickle-down 
effects have been modest. Therefore, inequality and growth should be considered as 
relatively independent phenomena. 
 
Welfare and policies on inequalities 
 
Inequalities in terms of disposable income and living standards are the results of state 
actions that can mitigate the outcomes of market processes. Governments can act 
through taxation, social transfers and the provision of in-kind services. National 
experiences widely differ, according to welfare regimes. Public social spending 
ranges from about 25 percent of GDP in Nordic and Continental Europe regimes to 19 
per cent in Anglo-Saxon countries, where a high share of smaller overall transfers (43 
per cent) is targeted to the bottom quintile of income earners. While there are 
difficulties in assessing the impact of in-kind transfers, estimates of the impact on 
inequalities of public services – in particular universal access to education and health 
– suggest that the on average they reduce the  Gini coefficient on disposable income 
by 37 percent in countries of the Nordic welfare regime and 24 percent in both the 
Anglo-Saxon and Continental Europe (where Italy and Spain are included) groups 
(Salverda et al, 2009, ch.25).  
Concern about the negative effects on growth of high public deficits, progressive 
taxation and a generous welfare system has led to policies that  have weakened the 
extent and the effectiveness of redistribution through the welfare state and have 
contributed to worsen  inequality.  
In order to limit and reverse such pattern, a comprehensive policy should address the 
challenge of inequality, combining incomes policies protecting real wages and greater   7
fiscal pressure on capital incomes, with action of different fronts, including the supply 
side (where the forces of finance, technology and globalisation lead to increasingly 
unequal market outcomes), labour markets (reversing the weakening and precarisation 
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